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NEWLY IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON CITIZENS'
RIGHT TO SUE FOR STANDING IN A
PROCEDURAL RIGHTS CASE
Ilyssa Birnbach*

INTRODUCTION

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") requires that federal agencies "include in every recommendation
or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on the environmental impact of the proposed action."' This statement is
commonly known as an Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS").
As NEPA does not provide for a private right of action, citizens
have brought suits against federal agencies, to enforce compliance with NEPA, under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").2 Under the APA, an individual has standing to sue an
3
agency if he or she is adversely affected by an agency action.
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1998; B.S. Cornell University, 1995. I would like to thank Professor Matthew Diller for his
thoughtful comments and suggestions, and my parents for their support and encouragement.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1996).
2. 60 Stat. 237 (enactment repealed; provisions codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
Despite NEPA's broad provisions designed to safeguard the
environment, it fails to provide citizens a private right of action that would allow them to challenge agency noncompliance and to enforce NEPA provisions. Thus, litigants can
gain judicial review only if they comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which enables people who are adversely affected by agency action to obtain judicial recourse.
Silvia L. Serpe, Note, Reviewability of Environmental Impact Statements on
Legislative Proposals After Franklin v. Massachusetts, 80 CORNELL L. REv.
413 (1995) (citations omitted).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides in pertinent part, "A person suffering
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Over time, the standard for citizen suits has been refined by
the courts. Under the standard recently articulated by the D.C.
Circuit in Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen,4 however, a citizen
will have to overcome an almost insurmountable hurdle to establish standing to compel an agency to prepare an EIS to fulfill its
duties under NEPA. Under Florida Audubon, a plaintiff must show
that a ". . . demonstrated particularized injury is fairly traceable
to the agency act allegedly implicating the EIS. And it requires
. . . that this challenged act [be] substantially probable to cause
the demonstrated particularized injury."5
This differs from the two-part test previously set forth by the
D.C. Circuit in City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.6 It also puts the D.C. Circuit in direct conflict with
both the Ninth Circuit 7 and the Tenth Circuit.' The latter specifically rejected the Florida Audubon analysis, stating that, "[t]o the
extent that the D.C. Circuit's standard requires a plaintiff to establish something more than set out here, it is contrary to the
intent and essence of the National Environmental Policy Act and
is, therefore, rejected."9
This Note argues that the standard to establish standing set
forth by the D.C. Circuit in Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen will
make it virtually impossible for a citizen to compel a government
agency to prepare an EIS as required by statute. By erecting this
barrier to citizen enforcement of NEPA, the D.C. Circuit is abdicating its responsibility to enforce this act. Instead of showing
deference to the other branches of government, the new standard established by the court would thwart the Congressional
goal of, "establish [ing] . . . a national policy to guide Federal ac-

legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof."
4. 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
5. Id. at 665 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
6. 912 E2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
7. See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th
Cir. 1992); infra Part III.B.2.
,8. See Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445
(10th Cir 1996).
9. Id. at 451.
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tivities which are involved with or related to the management of
the environment or which have an impact on the quality of the
environment."10 Moreover, outright rejection of this standard by
the Tenth Circuit is further evidence that this new standard is
contrary to the spirit of NEPA.
Part I of this Note describes NEPA and how courts have allowed suits to enforce this act. Part II examines how courts have
granted standing in citizen suits involving NEPA and outlines
how the doctrine of standing has developed in NEPA litigation.
Part III argues that under the new standard to establish standing
set forth in Florida Audubon, it will be virtually impossible to
grant standing to any citizen bringing suit to enforce the provisions of NEPA. This Note concludes that the Florida Audubon
standard should be rejected and that the courts should evaluate
standing under an analysis similar to the one provided by Rio
Hondo v. Lucero.1'
I. NEPA POLICY
A. Environmental Impact Statements
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 1 2 is
the country's "basic national charter for protection of the environment." 13 Congress enacted NEPA specifically to "declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment. 1 4 Under NEPA, all
agencies of the federal government are required to include in
every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the environment, a detailed statement of the environmental impact of the proposed action, or an "EIS."1 5

10. 115 CONG. REC. 19,010 (1969).
11. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
12. Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
13. City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
912 F2d 478, 491 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a)).
14. 115 CONG. REC. 19,008 (1969).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1996); see also Lawrence Gerschwer,
Informational Standing Under NEPA: Justiciability and the Environmental
DecisionmakingProcess, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 996, 996 (1993).
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The EIS is crucial to achieving the objectives of NEPA, because
it requires an agency to consider all relevant information regard16
ing the environment before setting forth on a course of action.
The EIS enables an agency to predict and possibly avoid an environmental crisis by studying the possible effects of the agency's
action. 7 In fact, if a project does involve "serious but nonobvious
environmental impacts, agency failure to prepare an EIS may
mean that the last opportunity to eliminate or minimize these
impacts, in accordance with NEPA's broad objectives, has been
lost."'1 8 Therefore, it is essential that a governmental agency pre-

pare the EIS in a timely fashion so that it will not only be valuable to the agency during its decisionmaking process, but will also
satisfy Congress' objectives.' 9
The EIS is a procedural obligation created to ensure that
agencies accord proper weight to the environmental consequences of their actions.20 Two purposes of the impact statement

16. See, e.g., Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32
F.3d 1346, 1359 (9th Cir. 1994) ("NEPA does not require [that we] decide whether an [environmental impact statement] is based on the best
scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA require us to resolve
disagreements among various scientists as to methodology. Our task is
to ensure that the .

.

. procedures resulted in a reasoned analysis and

disclosure of the evidence before it.") (alteration in original) (citations
omitted); Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir.
1985) ("IT]he principal purposes of NEPA include making consideration of environmental concerns a part of the decision-making process.") (citations omitted).
17. See City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 496.

18. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 1975); see
also Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 448 ("By focusing the agency's attention on
the environmental consequences of its actions, the National Environmental Policy Act 'ensures that important effects will not be overlooked
or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been
committed or the die otherwise cast.'" (quoting Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)).
19. See Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 452 ("Under the National Environmental Policy Act, an injury results not from the agency's decision, but
from the agency's uninformed decisionmaking.").
20. See Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1498; see also Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d
at 448 ("While the National Environmental Policy Act itself does not
mandate the particular decisions an agency must reach, it does mandate the necessary process the agency must follow while reaching its
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are (1) "to inject environmental considerations into the federal
agency's decisionmaking process," 21 and (2) "to inform the public that the agency has considered environmental concerns in its
22
decisionmaking process.
Under the statute, an agency must first conduct an environmental assessment ("EA') to decide whether the impact on the
environment would warrant an EIS. 23 The EA must be timely
enough to make a contribution in the decisionmaking process
and cannot be used merely to rationalize decisions previously
made.2 4
An agency will then commence the "scoping process" to determine the scope of the issues to be addressed and to identify the
significant issues related to a proposed action.25 If the agency decides not to prepare an EIS on the basis of the EA, then the
26
agency must prepare a finding of "no significant impact."
B.

Evaluating an EIS

In several cases, courts have formulated standards to evaluate
either the adequacy of an EIS2 7 or an agency's decision not to
prepare an EIS. 28 In reviewing an individual's challenge to an
agency action, a court may only review the procedural dictates of

decisions.").
21. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs, N.M. v. United States Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1434 (10th Cir. 1996).
22. Id.
23. See Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1498; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(E); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1994).
24. See City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 485; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5
(1998).
25. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1998).
26. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1996).
27. See, e.g., Salmon River, 32 F.3d 1346; Resources Limited v. Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1993); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt,
998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1993); Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d 1508.
28. See, e.g., Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Public Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 848 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Forelaws on Board, 743 F.2d 677; City
of Davis, 521 F.2d 661.
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NEPA, and not the agency's substantive decision. 29
1. The Standard to Evaluate the Adequacy of an EIS
Before reviewing the adequacy of an EIS, a court must examine several factors pertaining to the EIS preparation and implementation. There are regulations involved in implementing
an EIS:
First, the regulations require a 'rigorous analysis' of alternatives
to the proposed plan, including a 'substantial treatment' of
these alternatives in comparison to the proposed plan. Second,
the regulations require an agency undertaking an EIS to 'insure [sic] the professional integrity, including scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses in environmental impact
statements.' Additionally, the regulations require that the analysis be undertaken with an 'interdisciplinary approach' to 'insure [sic] the integrated use of the natural and social sciences
and the environmental design arts.' NEPA also requires consideration in an EIS of the 'ecological effects of a proposed
30
action.'
The Ninth Circuit employs a two-part test to evaluate whether an
agency has followed these regulations.3" This test asks (1)
whether the EIS contains a "reasonably thorough discussion of
the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences, '3 2 and (2) whether the agency has "taken a 'hard look'
at a decision's environmental consequences." 33 If the court is sat-

29. See Matthew William Nelson, NEPA and Standing: Halting the
Spread of "Slash-And-Burn"Jurisprudence,31 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 253 (1997)
("Therefore, while environmental groups can challenge the procedural
adequacy of an EIS, they cannot use the courts to impose or require
any particular result."); see also William M. Orr, Florida Audubon Society
v. Bentsen: An Improper Application of Lujan to a ProceduralRights Plaintiff,
15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 373, 379 (1997) ("Since NEPA imposes only procedural requirements on governmental agencies, NEPA lawsuits typically challenge shortcomings in EIS preparation procedures." (internal
citations omitted)).
30. Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 616 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted).
31. See Seattle Audubon, 998 F.2d at 703 (citing Idaho Conservation
League, 956 F.2d at 1519).
32. Id.
33. id.
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isfied that the agency has sufficiently examined the possible environmental consequences, it will uphold the agency's EIS.
2.

Review of an Agency's Decision Not to Prepare an EIS

Under NEPA, an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS will
be overturned if the decision was "arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion." 34 The D.C. Circuit articulated a four-part
test to determine whether an agency's decision should be
overturned:
(1) Whether the agency took a 'hard look' at the problem; (2)
whether the agency identified the relevant areas of environmental concern; (3) as to the problems studied and identified,
whether the agency made a convincing case that the impact was
insignificant; and (4) if there was an impact of true significance, whether the agency convincingly established that
changes in the project sufficiently reduced it to a minimum."
In addition to these guidelines, the decision not to prepare an
EIS will be considered unreasonable if the agency, "fails to supply a convincing statement of reasons why potential effects are
insignificant." 36 Courts have applied this test to compel agencies
to complete an EIS before taking action.3"
C.

Citizen Suits Under NEPA

There is no explicit provision allowing a private right of action
under NEPA;38 therefore, citizens' suits are brought under section 1OA of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 39 The

34. City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 499.
35. Id. at 499-500.
36. Id. at 500 (citations omitted).
37. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(holding that the United States Forestry Service and the Department of
the Interior had not complied with the EIS requirement of NEPA when
the agencies issued oil and gas leases.); S.W. Neighborhood v. Eckard,
445 F. Supp. 1195 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that the Government Services Administration should have prepared an EIS before entering into
a lease for a building that would result in 2,300 federal office workers
entering the neighborhood each day).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1996).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1996); see also Matthew Porterfield, Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative: The (Con)fusion of APA Standing
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APA provides that "a person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. '' 40 There are additional factors that determine
41
whether a plaintiff will get judicial review under the APA.
To sue under the APA, a plaintiff is required to "identify the
'agency action' affecting his interests and must demonstrate that
the 'interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.' ",42 Satisfying the test also establishes the minimum standing require43
ments set forth under Article III of the Constitution.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF STANDING

Standing requirements ensure that the litigants have such a
"'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to guarantee that 'the dispute sought to be adjudicated' will be presented
in an adversary context," 44 to guarantee that the case adequately
informs the court of the effects of its decisions, 45 and to determine whether the litigant is the proper party to invoke the

and the Merits Under NEPA, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 157, 160 (1995)
("Plaintiffs generally rely upon the APA for standing when they are attempting to compel federal agency compliance with statutes such as
NEPA that do not contain their own judicial review provisions." (citations omitted)).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
41. See, e.g., Serpe, supra note 2, at 418-19.
(1) whether review is precluded by statute or agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law, (2) the action must
be by a "federal agency" and (3) suits brought under the
general review provision of the APA must challenge a final
agency action.
Id.
42. Foundation on Econ. Trends, 943 F.2d at 82.
43. See Salmon River, 32 E3d at 1354.
44. Nuiimee A. Shim, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman:
When A Tree Falls In The Forest, Is Anything Left (0) Standing?, 15 TEMP.
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 277, 285 (1996)'.
45. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ.
221, 222 (1988).
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power of the court.46
Standing is one of the "justiciability" doctrines arising from Article III of the Constitution which limits federal court jurisdiction
to actual "cases or controversies." 47 The case or controversy requirement serves to identify disputes appropriately reviewable
under the judicial process. 48 The underlying question is whether
"the plaintiff has a legal right to judicial enforcement of an asserted duty."49 Therefore, to establish standing a litigant must fulfill two requirements. First to satisfy Article III, the party bringing suit must show: (1) actual or threatened injury (2) suffered
as a result of the defendant's conduct which (3) is fairly traceable to the challenged action and (4) is likely to be redressed by
a favorable decision.50
The second requirement is satisfaction of certain prudential
limitations imposed by the courts.51 These include the requirement that the injury not be a common grievance shared equally
by all or a large class of citizens, 52 that the legal rights and interests are the plaintiff's own and not a third party's, 5 3 and that the
complaint lies within the "zone of interests" protected by the rel-

46. See Lawrence Gerschwer, Informational Standing Under NEPA:
Justiciability and the Environmental Decisionmaking Process, 93 COLUM. L.
REv. 996, 1006 (1993).
47. U.S. CONST. art. III.
48. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
49. Fletcher, supra note 44, at 229.
50. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
51. See Gerschwer, supra note 45, at 1009; see also Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal
right, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches,
and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within
the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.
Id.
52. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
499 (1975)).
53. See id.
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evant statute or constitutional provision.5 4 Through case law, the
courts have refined and given definition to the concept of
55
standing.
A.

How Citizen Suits Have Evolved in NEPA Litigation

A citizen must demonstrate standing before bringing a suit to
enforce the requirements of NEPA. Over time courts have shown
increasing reluctance to grant standing to citizens, making it
more difficult for courts to reach the merits of environmental
cases.
1. The Standard Pre-Lujan
In Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp,56 the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to evaluate standing. Under
this test, the plaintiff must show that the challenged action has
caused him "injury in fact, economic or otherwise, '57 and that
his interest is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."5 8 This standard was further developed in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans for Separation of Church & State,59 in
which the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to determine whether a plaintiff has standing. Under that test, the plaintiff must show: (1) a distinct and palpable injury that is (2) fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) relief from the injury
must be likely to follow from a favorable decisionY'
2.

The Standard Enunciated in Lujan

The Supreme Court addressed the standing inquiry again in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.61 The statute at issue in Lujan6 2 re-

54. See id. (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Services Org. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
55. See id.
56. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
57. Id. at 152.
58. Id. at 153.
59. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
60. See id. at 472.
61. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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quired the Secretary of the Interior to use certain criteria to create a list of species which are either endangered or threatened,
and to define the critical habitats of those species. 63 This statute
was initially read to include actions taken in foreign nations, but
was eventually revised to include only actions taken in the
United States or on the high seas. 64 Shortly after the statute was
reinterpreted, the respondents sued the Secretary of the Interior,
seeking a declaratory judgement stating that the new regulation
was in error, and asking for an injunction to restore the initial
interpretation of the statute. The Court denied standing to these
groups on several grounds.
First, in focusing on the affidavits of two of the members of
the environmental groups, the Court held that these two respondents could not demonstrate the actual or imminent requirement of the standing doctrine. The Court stated that the respondents only had an uncertain future plan to visit the habitats of
65
the endangered species abroad.
Moreover, a plurality of the Court foun4 that the respondents
failed to show redressability because they did not attack specific
decisions to fund particular projects, but instead challenged generalized government action. 66 Finally, the Court held that the respondents failed to demonstrate the injury-in-fact requirement
necessary to show standing, because they were raising a generalized grievance, "claiming only harm to .. . every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits [any
specific individuals] than it does the public at large .... "67
Finally, the Supreme Court enumerated what it described as
68
the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing":
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1996).
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555.
See id. at 557.
See id. at 563.
See id. at 568 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 573.
See id. at 560.
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and particularized, 69 and (b) be "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical'." 70 Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of
the injury has to be "fairly traceable to the challenged cause
of action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court."71 Third,
that the
it must be "likely" as opposed to "merely speculative,"
'72
injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision.
This standard is both rigid and elastic: ".

.

. rigid in that it un-

equivocally requires the plaintiff to make a particularized demonstration of a redressable injury caused by the unlawful conduct
alleged in the complaint . . . elastic in allowing Congress to ex-

73
pand or confine the types of legal injury that may be alleged.
Additionally, the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
74
burden of establishing the elements of standing.
Plaintiffs who bring suit after Lujan have a stricter burden to
establish that the challenged government action caused the specific injury-in-fact. 7 A series of cases followed in which courts
found that environmental plaintiffs had standing under this

analysis.

76

69. See, e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 756; Warth, 422 U.S. at 508.

70. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
71. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42
(1976).

72. Id. at 38.
73. Robert B. June, The Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen
Suits and the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L. 761, 771 (1994).

74. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Wellton Mohawk Irrigation &
Drainage Dist., No. 96-16434, 1997 WL 377172 (9th Cir. July 7, 1997).
75. See Portland Audubon, 998 E2d at 707. But see William M. Orr,
Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen: An Improper Application of Lujan to a
Procedural Rights Plaintiff 15 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 373, 386 (1997) ("Although the Court did not use the term, it recognized that a showing of
a geographical nexus creates a concrete interest. Therefore, such a
showing would satisfy the standing requirement of injury in fact.")
76. See, e.g., Catron County, 75 F.3d 1429; Douglas County, 48 E3d
1495; Sierra Club, 43 F3d 606; Salmon River, 32 F.3d 1346; Resources Limited, 35 F.3d 1300; Portland Audubon, 998 F.2d 705; Seattle Audubon, 998
E2d 699.

1998]
B.

STANDING IN A PROCEDURAL RIGHTS CASE
Narrowing the Lujan Standard: Florida Audubon Society y.
Bentsen

In 1996, the D.C. Circuit evaluated a question of standing in
Florida-Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen,77 and articulated a new standard
which places a higher burden on an environmental plaintiff to
bring suit in procedural cases. This new standard, in the words
of the dissent, "imposes so heavy an evidentiary burden on appellants to establish standing that it will be virtually impossible to
78
bring a NEPA challenge to rulemakings with diffuse impacts."
Even the majority noted that "a plaintiff seeking to challenge a
governmental action with alleged diverse environmental impacts
may have some difficulty meeting this standard." 79
The court held that Diane Jensen, the Florida Audubon Society, the Florida Wildlife Federation, and the Friends of the Earth
did not have standing to sue the Secretary of the Treasury and
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service for authorizing a tax credit for the use of ethyl tertiary butyl ether
("ETBE"), a fuel additive, without preparing an EIS.80 The plaintiffs argued that the tax credit, authorized by the Internal Revenue Service for use of ETBE as a fuel alternative, would increase
the market for ETBE, which in turn would stimulate production
of corn, sugar cane, and sugar beets; necessary ingredients from
which ETBE is derived. Following from this reasoning, the increased crop production would result in more agricultural cultivation with its "accompanying environmental dangers, in regions
that border wildlife areas appellants (or their members) use and
81
enjoy."
The court rejected the appellants' notion that the asserted areas (Minnesota, Michigan or Florida) would necessarily be affected by the tax credit; therefore, they did not demonstrate injury sufficient for standing.8 2 The court further found that the
threatened harm was not imminent. The court used a relaxed

77. 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
78. Id. at 674 (Rogers, J., Edwards, J., Wald, J., and Tatel, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 666.
80. Id. at 662.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 667.
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standard to determine imminence. Under the standard, the party
asserting the claim under NEPA need only show that there is a
risk of serious environmental harm, and not a certainty. 3
Previously, in City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Admin.,8 4 the court articulated a different, two-pronged test. The
first prong required the plaintiff to show that the "agencies[']
failure to prepare an EIS creates a risk that serious environmental harms will be overlooked." 5 The second prong required that
the plaintiff show that he "has a sufficient geographical nexus to
the site of the challenged project that he may be expected to
suffer whatever environmental consequences the project might
have. "86
Under Florida Audubon, the first prong of the new test mandates that the plaintiff have a particularized injury, 7 a threshold
requirement under the Lujan standard set forth in 1992.88 Under
the second prong of the new test, however, the injury must be
demonstrable.8 9 To qualify as a particularized injury the plaintiff
must show that the "demonstrably increased risk of serious environmental harm shown actually threatens the plaintiff's particularized interest." 90 As the majority explains, this new standard replaces the previous standard, which did not explicitly state that
the governmental action must subject a particularized interest of
the plaintiff to increased risk. 91
The third prong of the new standard requires that the demonstrable particularized injury be fairly traceable to the agency action. 92 This is a well-established principle under the doctrine of
standing. 93 This prong requires a causation analysis linking the
government decision that may have wrongly omitted the EIS to

83.
32 F.3d
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 678; see also Sierra Club, 46 F.3d at 611-12; Salmon River,
at 1355 n.14.
912 F2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 492.
Id.
See 94 F.3d at 666.
See 504 U.S. 555, 559.
See 94 F.3d at 666.
Id. at 667.
Florida Audubon, 94 E3d at 667.
See id. at 666.
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572.
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the plaintiffs particularized injury.94 Under the fourth prong of
the test, however, the D.C. Circuit read the causation analysis as
a requirement that it must be substantially probable that the
agency action will cause the demonstrable injury asserted by the
95
plaintiff.
The fourth prong of the test erects a virtually insurmountable
hurdle for plaintiffs to establish standing in NEPA cases. In Florida Audubon, Ms. Jensen established the requisite "geographical
nexus" to the injury, as noted by the dissent. 96 This nexus is established through her experience on several Minnesota environmental task forces, state environmental advisory groups, and the
State Board of Water and Soil Resources. Through her experiences, Ms. Jensen concluded that local farmers are likely to
abandon crop rotation to develop land to take advantage of the
tax credit. This, in turn, would result in the susceptibility of
these lands to erosion. 97 Additionally, she found that obtaining
greater yields from the farmland through increased use of pesticides and fertilizer resulted in threatening wildlife habitats
through soil erosion and water pollution. 98 Moreover, Ms. Jensen
referred to meetings in which State representatives advised her
that the ETBE tax credit is likely to increase corn farming in
Minnesota and that an EIS could result in the destruction of
market opportunities for Minnesota corn. 99 Finally, Ms. Jensen asserted that the tax credit would affect her drinking water because of the increased use of the possible carcinogenic pesticide
atrazine, which has been found in groundwater and drinking
water.10°
The EIS was intended to provide "full and fair discussion of
significant environmental impacts and [to] inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which
would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 669.
See id.
Id. at 677 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 678.
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of the human environment."'' 1 The purpose of the EIS is to discover the possible effects that the agency action will have on the
environment. Thus, NEPA is concerned with conditional and indirect harms. If the environmental harms were certain there
would be no need for an EIS, because the effect of the agency
action on the environment would be known.10 2 In fact, by forcing
a citizen to undertake the exact investigation that they are asking
the federal agency to conduct, a court is essentially shifting the
10 3
burden placed on the agency under NEPA to the citizen.
If, however, the purpose of the EIS is to study and consider
04
any effects an agency action will have on the environment,
then an appellant's injury-in-fact consists of the agency's failure
to prepare an EIS. 05 Since the appellees did not prepare an EIS
before granting a tax credit, they may have put her at risk. If
Congress viewed this risk as significant enough to mandate assessment, it cannot be dismissed as simply speculative. By virtue
of statute, Congress can create rights, and can elevate injuries to
legally cognizable rights, the invasion of which creates standing. 10 6 Therefore, protection of the risks of not preparing an EIS
is a right created by Congress that establishes the basis for standing in this case.
Congress granted the tax credit to include the use of blends of
gasoline and ETBE. 0 7 Presumably, Congress granted the tax
credit to provide an incentive for the use and production of

101. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1996).
102. See Rio Hondo, 102 E3d at 448-49 ("The injury of an increased
risk of harm due to an agency's uninformed decision is precisely the
type of injury the National Environmental Policy Act was designed to
prevent.").
103. See Nelson, supra note 28.
104. See 115 CONG. REc. 19,008 (1969.)
105. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a failure to prepare an
EIS can constitute an injury-in-fact. Specifically, the court stated that,
"[the asserted injury is that environmental consequences might be
overlooked and reasonable alternatives ignored as a result of deficiencies in the final EIS and ROD." Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at
1518.
106. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
107. See Florida Audubon, 94 E3d at 662.
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ETBE.'0 The D.C. Circuit held that the appellant's interests were
too speculative because they could not demonstrate that individual corn or sugar farmers in these areas would affirmatively respond to the tax credit by increasing production.10 9 The court
found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate injury sufficient for
standing, because they were unable to identify the individual
farmers who would be affected by the tax credit.
C.

How Other Circuits Have Addressed the Analysis
1. The Tenth Circuit: Rio Hondo v. Lucero

After the D.C. Circuit decided Florida Audubon Soc' v. Bentsen,
the Tenth Circuit, in Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero,"0
examined a similar challenge to citizens' standing in a procedural rights case and granted standing to the plaintiffs. In Rio
Hondo,"' the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether the Committee to
Save the Rio Hondo had standing to challenge the Carson National Forest Service's decision to allow summertime use of the
Taos Valley Ski Area.1 12 Members of the Committee submitted affidavits, claiming they used and enjoyed the land and water surrounding the Ski Area for recreation and irrigation. Additionally,
the affiants claimed their use and enjoyment of the area's land
and water would be damaged by the year-round operation of the
Ski Area." 3
The Ski Area operates under term and special-use permits issued by the Carson National Forest Service ("Forest Service").114
The Ski Area proposed a plan to the Forest Service in 1981,
which included an EIS in accordance with NEPA. The Ski Area
later proposed an amendment to this plan to allow for summertime use of the facilities, which was not accounted for in the
original EIS prepared for the Forest Service. In response to this
amendment, the Forest Service prepared an EA, and reached a

108. See id.

109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 667.
102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 446.

113. Id. at 447.
114. See id.
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finding of "no significant impact," thereby excusing the preparation of an EIS. The Committee then brought an action in federal court claiming:
[T]he Forest Service's approval of the amended master development plan and special use permit was either a 'major Federal
action significantly affecting the . ..environment' requiring the
Forest Service to prepare an environmental impact statement,
or the approval was a 'substantial change' to the plan, requiring the Forest Service to prepare a supplemental environmental
15
impact statement.
The District Court found that the Committee to Save the Rio
Hondo ("the Committee") did not have standing to challenge
the Ski Area's decision to allow summertime use of the facilities,
and granted summary judgment to the Ski Area.11 6 The Committee then appealed the case which brought the issue before the
Court of Appeals. 117 The Tenth Circuit reversed this decision,
and remanded the case for consideration on the merits.11 8
The court evaluated the Committee's standing under the
three-pronged analysis set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,11 9
and, in so doing, specifically rejected the standing analysis applied by the D.C. Circuit in Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen.120 In
addition to establishing standing through the constitutional requirements, the court held that the Committee had to show that
they were "adversely affected or aggrieved . . .within the meaning of a relevant statute.1 21 To establish that the Committee was
adversely affected, they had to demonstrate an "injury-in-fact"
falling within the "zone of interests" protected by NEPA.1 22 The
court found that the "injury-in-fact" prong was satisfied in a twopart analysis:
(1) [T]he litigant must show that in making its decision without following the National Environmental Policy Act's proce-

115. Id. at 447.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 446.
118. See id.
119. 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). For a full discussion of Constitutional standing requirements set forth in this case see supra Part II.A.2.
120. 94 E3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
121. Rio Hondo, 102 F3d at 448 (citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 883 (alteration in original).
122. Id.

1998]

STANDING IN A PROCEDURAL RIGHTS CASE

dures, the agency created an increased risk of actual, threatened
or imminent environmental harm; and (2) the litigant must show
that the increased risk of environmental harm injures its concrete interests by demonstrating either its geographical
nexus to,
23
or actual use of the site of the agency actionY.
In examining the Committee's injury-in-fact, the court looked
to the purpose of NEPA "to protect and promote environmental
quality." 2 4 The court found that the Committee satisfied the requirement for injury-in-fact, because "injury of alleged increased
environmental risks due to an agency's uninformed decisionmak''
ing may be the foundation for injury-in-fact under Article III. 125
The court also found, through the plaintiffs affidavits, that the
Committee established an increased risk of environmental harm
to their concrete interests. 2 6 Therefore, the Forest Service's alleged procedural failure to complete an EIS affected the plaintiff's concrete interest in using the land in the affected area, thus
establishing injury-in-fact.
Establishing causation is the second prong of the standing
analysis established in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.2 7 The court
analyzed causation by showing that "[i]n the context of a National Environmental Policy Act claim, the injury is the increased
risk of environmental harm to concrete interests, and the conduct complained of is the agency's failure to follow the National
Environmental Policy Act's procedures.' 1 28 This inquiry contradicts the inquiry conducted by the D.C. Circuit in Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen,12 9 in which the plaintiff had to establish the
substantial probability that the challenged act would cause the
demonstrated particularized injury. 130
The Tenth Circuit claimed that the D.C. Circuit's causation
analysis was misplaced, and that the latter court was confusing an
analysis that would be better placed in the "likelihood of harm"
prong of the analysis, rather than in the causation prong. 3 ' The
Tenth Circuit noted that in determining causation, a court

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 449 (emphases added).
Id. at 448; see also supra Part I.A.
Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 449.
See id.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451.
94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
See id. at 669.
See Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451.
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should merely look at the relation between the risk of the plaintiffs harm and the alleged agency failure to prepare an EIS in
accordance with NEPA. The court also noted that:
To require that a plaintiff establish that the agency action-will
result in the very impacts an environmental impact statement is
meant to examine is contrary to the spirit and purpose of the
National Environmental Policy Act. The National Environmental Policy Act was not intended to require the plaintiff to show
with certainty, or even with a substantial probability, the result
of agency action; those examinations are left to an environmen132
tal impact statement.
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit rejected the additional hurdle erected by the D.C. Circuit in situations in which a citizen attempts
to compel a government agency to comply with the mandates of
NEPA.
2.

The Ninth Circuit

In various cases, the Ninth Circuit has also applied a more liberal test of standing for environmental plaintiffs. In one Ninth
Circuit case, Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma,133 a group of
conservationists ("ICL") challenged the Idaho Panhandle Forest's ("IPNF") decision to recommend against wilderness designation of forty-three roadless areas within the forest. 134 ICL
claimed that the IPNF had violated both the National Forest
Management Act and NEPA1 35 The district court found that the
ICL did not have standing. The Court of Appeals reversed the
finding that the group had standing, but upheld the district
court's decision on the merits.
In analyzing the claim of standing, the Ninth Circuit looked at
three elements: "(1) personal injury (2) fairly traceable to the
defendant's unlawful conduct and (3) likely to be redressed by the
requested relief."1 3 6 In evaluating the personal injury requirement, the court decided to look to the statutes to determine if
the plaintiffs demonstrated an injury. The court reasoned that,

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 452.
956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1510.
See id.
Id. at 1513.
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[t]he right claimed by appellants is, among others, the right to
have agencies consider all reasonable alternatives before making a decision affecting the environment, as required by NEPA.
• . . 'NEPA is essentially a procedural statute designed to ensure

that environmental issues are given proper consideration in the
decisionmaking process,' injury alleged to have occurred137 as a
result of violating this procedural right confers standing.
The court then dealt with the next two elements of the standing
requirement together. The court found that causation concerned
only whether the injury was dependent upon the agency's decision. In the instant case, the injury was that the "environmental
consequences might be overlooked and reasonable alternatives
138
ignored as a result of deficiencies in the final EIS and ROD."
Therefore, causation is satisfied because this injury would not
have occurred but for IPNF's decision not to follow the mandates of the statutes at issue. Thus, the court found that ICL had
satisfied all three prongs of the test, and reversed the denial of
standing.139

III. RECONCILIATION OF THE ANALYSES
In Florida Audubon, the court should not have dismissed Ms.
Jensen's claim without reaching the merits of the case simply because her injuries were threatened rather than actual, nor should
it have mattered that her risk of injury was contingent rather
than certain. 140 NEPA is precisely aimed at identifying indirect
and contingent harms that may be caused by agency action, by
conducting research and handling investigations relating to eco1 41
logical systems and environmental quality.
Under Florida Audubon, environmental plaintiffs must identify
an individual whose behavior will change as a result of an agency
action. Thus, no individual would be able to bring suit in these
types of cases. In Florida Audubon the injury was speculative by
nature because the plaintiff was asking the Commissioner of the
Treasury and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service

137. Id. at 1514 (citing Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d at
1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1986)).
138. Id. at 1518.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1515.
141. See 115 CONG. REC. 19,008 (1969).
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to assess the possible risks that authorizing the tax credit would
pose to the environment. 142 The court suggested that to obtain
judicial review of an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS the
plaintiff must show exactly who will respond to the agency action, and in what manner. If this requirement is mandated by
the courts, then no plaintiff will be able to bring suit to compel
a government agency to prepare an EIS.
Even if the court defines the injury more strictly, the causation
analysis should be viewed more broadly. In an EIS case, the
causal chain contains two links: "one connecting the omitted EIS
to some substantive government decision that may have been
wrongly decided because of the lack of an EIS and one connecting that substantive decision to the plaintiff's particularized injury." 143 The court stated that even if the plaintiffs had suffered a
demonstrated particularized injury, which the court held they
did not, the plaintiffs did not show that the injury was fairly
traceable to the tax credit. 144 Yet the court itself acknowledged
that the production of ETBE had increased since the promulga145
tion of the tax credit.
Accordingly, the appellant's injury should not have been considered too speculative based on this fact alone. The court
should have read the chain of causation broadly enough to allow
the plaintiff's standing, because the increase in production of
ETBE is the link that connects the challenged acts to the asserted injury. Therefore, the court should have found that Diane
Jensen had standing based on the fact that the particularized injury that she demonstrated was fairly traceable to the tax credit
authorized by defendants.
If the appellants in Florida Audubon could not demonstrate
standing, then it is difficult to envision any plaintiff establishing
standing under the standard created by the D.C. Circuit. The
only way for a plaintiff to satisfy the "substantially probable"
prong of this standard is to actually be in harm's way before
bringing suit. This does not comport with the intention of Con-

142. See Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 661.
143. Id. at 668.
144. See id. at 669.
145. See id. at 661.
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gress in passing NEPA 1 46 Additionally, this standard does not
conform to the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife,147 because it ignores the right set out by
Congress to protect people from the risk of overlooking serious
environmental harms. The holding also puts the D.C. Circuit in
conflict with both the Tenth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit,
which has frequently found standing in cases similar to this
148
one.
If the D.C. Circuit had allowed Florida Audubon to go forward
on the merits, the purposes of the standing requirement would
still have been served. The facts in Florida Audubon are distinguishable from those under Lujan. The plaintiffs in Lujan could
not demonstrate standing, because they only had "some day" intentions of returning to the site in question.1 49 Additionally, the
plaintiffs lacked standing, because the alleged injury would not
be redressable by a favorable decision. 15 0 In Florida Audubon, the
appellants actually lived in the site at risk. Accordingly, any injury caused by the agency's failure to prepare an EIS would be
redressable by a favorable decision.
The appellants would have demonstrated standing under the
previous formulations of the standing doctrine. Thus, under a
broader reading of the standing doctrine, courts could find that
environmental plaintiffs have standing to bring suit, while remaining faithful to the constitutional requirements set forth in
Lujan. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit should adopt a standard that

146. See supra Part I.A.
147. 504 U.S. at 558.
148. See, e.g., Florida Audubon,94 F.3d at 674 (citing Douglas County,
48 E3d at 1499-1501; Salmon River, 32 F.3d at 1351-55; Resources Limited,
35 F.3d at 1302-03; PortlandAudubon, 998 F.2d at 707-08; Seattle Audubon,
998 F.2d at 702-03; Idaho Conservation League, 956 E2d at 1513-18). See
also generally Nelson, supra note 28. The author distinguishes between
the D.C. Circuit's and the Ninth Circuit's evidentiary burden to show
injury-in-fact and causation. The author notes that the D.C. Circuit requires that environmental plaintiffs show a demonstratable increased
risk of environmental harm threatening a particularized interest. However, the Ninth Circuit only requires an environmental plaintiff show
that a federal agency might overlook an environmental consequence.
149. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
150. See id. at 568.
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would allow plaintiffs in Florida Audubon to have standing to proceed with their suit. The test should be a three-part standard
that would address the requirements of injury-in-fact, causation
and redressability as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife. The D.C. Circuit would satisfy this standard
if it adopted a standard similar to the one proposed by the
5
Tenth Circuit in Rio Hondo.' '
Under the first prong of the test, a litigant would satisfy injuryin-fact if he or she could show "that in making its decision without following the National Environmental Policy Act's procedures, the agency created an increased risk of actual, threatened,
or imminent environmental harm,"' 5 2 including the harm created by the risk that serious environmental consequences will be
overlooked if an agency either fails to prepare an EIS, or
prepares an inadequate EIS. Allowing standing based on this
type of risk of injury incorporates the injury hypothesized by
both the Ninth Circuit, 153 and the D.C. Circuit's originally-con54
templated formulation of the standing analysis.
Additionally, the plaintiff must prove either a geographical
nexus to, or actual use of, the site in question, so that the litigant may be expected to suffer the consequences of the agency
action. To ensure that the risk of harm will be to plaintiff's particularized interests, a court should require some sort of geographical nexus to the site that the agency action is expected to
affect. Therefore, it is pertinent whether an agency's failure to

151. For an alternative solution to the circuit split see Nelson,
supra note 28. Nelson proposes a solution that requires Congress to enact statutory definitions of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.
Under this solution, the injury-in-fact prong would be satisfied if "the
plaintiff can show a reasonable relationship (economic, recreational,
aesthetic, or otherwise) to the area that the proposed action will potentially affect." Id. Causation would be satisfied "if the plaintiff can show
that potential environmental harm may result from the agency's action
and that this potential environmental harm will be addressed in the
EIS." Id. The author asserts that the causation definition would cover
the redressability analysis as well because, "redressability usually poses
no injury in NEPA cases." Id.
152. See Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 449.
153. See Idaho Conservation League, 956 .3d 1508.
154. See City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d 478.
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comply with NEPA's requirements has increased a risk of harm
to the land used by the plaintiff asserting the injury.'5 5
To satisfy the causation prong of the analysis, a litigant should
have to show that the injury is traceable to the agency action. 56
If a court allows definition of the injury prong as increased risk
of harm due to an agency's failure to prepare an EIS, then the
agency action is fairly traceable to the plaintiffs injury. 57 An environmental plaintiff should not be required to show that it is
substantially probable that the agency action will cause the injury
to the plaintiff, as required by the D.C. Circuit, because this will
create an overly burdensome hurdle to environmental plaintiffs.
Finally, a plaintiff should have to show that it is likely that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 5 8 In most NEPA
cases this would mean that a favorable decision would merely
compel the agency to perform an EIS, and would not require
the agency to undertake specific changes to the proposed action.
CONCLUSION

In Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen the D.C. Circuit expanded
upon the standard for standing established in previous cases and
added an extra requirement that the challenged act be "substantially probable" to cause the demonstrated particularized in-

155. See Matthew C. Porterfield, Agency Action, Finality and Geographical Nexus: Judicial Review of Agency Compliance with AEPA's Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement Requirement After Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 619, 660 (1994).
156. See Nelson, supra note 28, at 253.
157. See Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 451-452
Certainly, under the injury in fact prong, a plaintiff cannot
merely allege that some highly attenuated, fanciful environmental risk will result from the agency decision; the risk
must be actual, threatened or imminent. However, once the
plaintiff has established the likelihood of the ncreased risk
for purposes of injury in fact, to establish causation ....
the
plaintiff need only trace the risk of harm to the agency's alleged failure to follow the National Environmental Policy
Act's procedures.
Id.
158. See id. at 452 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
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jury.15 9 This new standard will make it virtually impossible for a
citizen to challenge a government agency's decision either not to
prepare an EIS, or to challenge the sufficiency of an EIS. 160 By
requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that a federal project will
have a particular environmental result, the court is, in effect, asking the individual to conduct the same investigation he or she is
asking the court to compel the agency to do. 161 Moreover, in
Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero the Tenth Circuit rejected this additional burden placed on environmental plaintiffs,
claiming that it frustrated the purposes and mandates of NEPA.
Since "compliance with NEPA is a primary duty of every federal
agency . . . fulfillment of this vital responsibility should not depend on the vigilance and limited resources of environmental
' 162
plaintiffs."
If Congress passed NEPA with the intention of compelling government agencies to perform an EIS before embarking on a project to "avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment,"'1 63 then the courts should not
frustrate this intent by creating an insurmountable burden on
environmental plaintiffs to bring suit. The D.C. Circuit test for
standing in Florida Audubon should be overturned, and the requirements for standing which are satisfied under the test in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 164 and reaffirmed in Rio Hondo v.
Lucero,165 should be applied in citizens' suits in procedural cases.
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160.
F.2d 705.
161.
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See Florida Audubon, 94 F.3d at 666.
See, e.g., Resources Limited, 35 F.3d 1300; PortlandAudubon, 998
See City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 670-71.
See id. at 670-71.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1996).
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555.
See Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 445.

